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B 
ederally  insured  commercial  banks  have  clarifies issues relating to the possible effects of 
been legally prohibited from paying interest  allowing  explicit  payment  of  interest  on 
on  demand  deposits  since  the  1930's.  The  demand deposits. 
effectiveness  of -the prohibition,  though,  has 
been  progressively  eroded  as banks  have 
devised  indirect methods  of  providing returns 
on  checking  account  funds.  The  rise  in  the 
general level of interest rates in recent years has 
provided impetus to the development of  these 
indirect  methods  for  attracting  demand 
deposits. In light of  this increasing evasion of 
the  intent  of  the  original  prohibition,  some 
have  suggested  that  the  prohibition  be 
repealed. Sentiment for  deregulation has been 
strengthened  by  recent  financial  innovations 
that permit interest payments on  demand-type 
balances. Innovation has progressed furthest in 
New  England, where Congress has authorized a 
wide  variety  of  financial institutions  to  offer 
interest-bearing accounts subject to negotiable 
orders of  withdrawal (NOW accounts). 
This article examines the arguments both for 
and  against  allowing  interest  payments  on 
demand  deposits  and  provides  an  historical 
perspective to the current debate.  In  the first 
section, the events leading up to the prohibition 
of  interest on  demand deposits are discussed. 
The  next  section  reviews  the  current 
controversy  regarding the  advisability  of 
retaining  the  prohibition.  The  final  section 
The Banking Act of 1933 
In the crisis atmosphere that resulted  from 
the  stock  market  collapse  in  1929  and  the 
ensuing  wave  of  bank  failures,  legislation  to 
reform the banking system  was  introduced in 
1933.  One  of  the  provisions  of  the  law  that 
became known as the Banking Act of 1933 was 
that interest be prohibited on demand deposits. 
Although concern about  the effects of  paying 
interest  on  demand  balances  had  been 
expressed intermittently since the middle of  the 
19th century, there had been no prior attempt 
to legislate prohibition. 
Historically, apprehension concerning inter- 
est payments on demand deposits had focused 
on the effects of  paying interest on interbank 
balances.'  It  was  often  alleged  that  the 
common  practice  of  country  banks  holding 
interest-earning  balances  at  New  York  City 
1 For  an  excellent discussion of the history of the debate 
regardig regulation of interest rates on bank deposits, see 
Charles  M.  Lie, "The  Evolution  of  Interest  Rate 
Regulation on  Commercial Bank  Deposits in  the  United 
States," National Banking Review, June  1%6. 
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banks resulted in a drain of  funds from rural 
areas which was detrimental to the agricultural 
economy. In retrospect, this argument does not 
seem  persuasive.  Due  to  the  seasonality  of 
agricultural  loan demand, country  banks 
needed short-term repositories for excess funds 
during  certain  periods  of  the  year. 
Interest-earning  balances at New  York  banks 
were  among  the  most  attractive  short-term 
investments available. Moreover, the rate paid 
on these interbank  balances was  substantially 
lower than rates on agricultural loans. Thus, it 
appears  doubtful  that  interest  payments  on 
bankers' balances caused a drain of funds from 
rural areas which reduced the ability of country 
banks to meet agricultural credit needs. 
There  was,  nevertheless,  a  valid  source  of 
concern  associated  with  interbank  deposits. 
The  New  York  banks  often  used  the  funds 
obtained from country banks to make call loans 
to  stock  market  investors.  When  seasonal 
increases in  agricultural credit needs coincided 
with a downturn in the stock market, the New 
York  banks-unable  to  call  the  loans 
collateralized with stocks-found it difficult to 
meet the requests of  country banks for deposit 
withdrawals. In this way, the effects of  liquidity 
crises  originating  on  Wall  Street  were 
transmitted to the rest of the economy. Interest 
on  interbank  deposits  was  thus  believed  by 
many  to  have  contributed  to  the  recurrent 
financial crises that had  plagued the  banking 
system for nearly a century. It was thought that 
prohibiting interest on  interbank deposits 
would help separate the fortunes of the banking 
system from the vagaries of  the stock market. 
Another  argument  that  appears  to  have 
contributed to adoption of  the prohibition on 
interest  on  demand  deposits  was  that 
prohibition  would  help  prevent  excessive 
competition among  banks.l  At  the  time  the 
Banking Act was being considered, much of the 
discussion  of  the  causes  of  the  recent  bank 
failures centered on the effects of  intense rate 
competition  for  deposits  during  the  1920's. 
Many observers believed that the unconstrained 
ability  of  banks  to  compete  for  funds  by 
bidding  up  rates  paid  on  deposits  had 
encouraged banks  to acquire  risky assets.  To 
cover  the  high  cost  of  deposit  funds,  it  was 
argued,  banks  had  been  forced  to  acquire 
higher  yielding,  albeit  riskier,  assets.  Banks' 
vulnerability to adverse economic developments 
was,  therefore,  believed  to  have  been  partly 
attributable  to  intense  rate competition. 
Imposition of ceilings on the rates banks could 
pay  for deposit funds,  it  was  thought,  would 
lead to a more stable banking environment. 
Another reason given for prohibiting interest 
on  demand  deposits was  that the  prohibition 
would reduce banks' expenses. The concern for 
bank  earnings  arose  in  connection  with  a 
separate provision of the Banking Act requiring 
banks to pay a subscription fee equal to .5 per 
cent of  their total deposits for Federal deposit 
insurance.= The  reduction  in  costs  resulting 
2 Senator Steagall, one of the sponsors of the Banking Act, 
emphasized  the need to establish  interest  rate ceilings on 
time  deposits  in  order  to  preclude  unsound  banking 
practices. This emphasis has been interpreted  by some as 
indicating  that he believed the chief benefit of  regulating 
interest rates on bank deposits was prevention of excessive 
rate competition. See Like, p. 466. 
3 The major  New  York  banks opposed  this  plan  for  two 
reasons.  First,  they  believed  that the financial instability 
which the measure was designed to alleviate was a problem 
only  in  rural  areas.  Perhaps  more  importantly,  the  New 
York banks considered  it  unfair  that they be required  to 
pay a subscription  fee based on their total deposits  when 
only a  small  Fraction  of  those deposits  would  have  been 
covered  by  Federal  insurance.  These same  banks favored 
prohibition of  interest  on  demand deposits,  and the fact 
that the  money  market  banks'  opposition  to the Federal 
deposit insurance program  coincided with the decision to 
include  the  provision  prohibiting  interest  on  demand 
deposits  in  the  Banking  Act  has been  interpreted  as an 
indication that a  deal  was made. See Carter H.  Golembe 
Associates, Inc.,  "Memorandum  re:  Interest on  Demand 
Deposits," reprinted in Studies on the Payment of Interest 
on  Checking  Accounts.  American  Bankers  Association, 
1976,  p.  61.  Whether  or  not  there was  a  quid  pro  quo 
relation between the two occurrences,  it is undeniable that 
some  considered  the  prohibition  of  interest  on  demand 
deposits as a method by which to recompense the banking 
industry  for  the  subscription  payments  to  the  Federal 
deposit insurance program. 
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from  prohibition  of  interest  on 'demand 
deposits  would,  it  was  argued,  increase  the 
depressed  level  of  bank  earnings  enough  to 
enable banks to pay the insurance subscription 
fee. 
Some  combination  of  these  disparate 
arguments  in favor  of  prohibiting interest  on 
demand deposits must have proved persuasive. 
The section of the Banking Act containing this 
provision was passed with very little discussion 
and  has  remained  an  important  part  of  the 
financial environment for more than 40 years. 
The impact of  the Prohibition 
Because  the  yield  on  financial  assets 
remained  comparatively  low  for  nearly  3 
decades after the Banking Act was passed, the 
prohibition  of  interest  payments  on  demand 
deposits had little impact  during that period. 
In the past 15 years, however, the general level 
of  interest  rates  has  risen  substantially,  and 
wealth owners have become more sophisticated 
in  managing their asset portfolios. Banks have 
thus  found  it  increasingly  necessary  to  offer 
some  inducements to attract demand  deposit 
funds.  In part because explicit  monetary 
interest on  demand  deposits  is  illegal,  banks 
have relied on various nonmonetary returns to " 
attract these funds. 
In  the  1960's,  many  banks  began  to offer 
reduced fee or "free" checking account plans, 
often  in  return  for  the  maintenance  of  a 
prespecified  minimum  or  average  balance  in 
the account.  Since a  bank  incurs  substantial 
costs in  maintaining  an account  and~.clearing 
the checks written on that account, provision of 
these services  without charge amounts to 
payment  of  implicit  interest  on  demand 
deposits. There are numerous other methods of 
making deposits attractive without paying 
interest explicitly: establishing extensive branch 
facilities,  maintaining  longer  banking  hours, 
providing  ancillary services  at  reduced  cost, 
and  allowing  customers  to  make  telephone 
transfers from their savings accounts.  Studies 
indicate  that  the  implicit  rate  is  both 
substantial  and  directly  related  to  market 
interest rates.'  Thus, banks have been able to 
circumvent the prohibition  of  interest  on 
demand deposits by  paying interest in various 
nonmonetary  forms,  thereby  frustrating  the 
original intent of the prohibition. 
Other  developments  have  diminished  the 
effectiveness of the original prohibition. Direct 
payment of  interest on interbank deposits has 
been  replaced by  interest on  balances sold  in 
the Federal funds market and  by  provision of 
various  services  by  correspondent  banks  at 
reduced  cost.  Large corporations  are  able  to 
earn  interest  on  short-term  funds  by  buying 
securities from a bank with the agreement that 
they be resold to the bank at a specified price 
(so-called "repurchase  transactions").  In the 
past  5  years,  individuals  in  parts  of  New 
England  have  been  able  to  write  negotiable 
orders  of  withdrawal  on  interest-bearing 
accounts at commercial  banks  and  thrift 
institutions. 
THE CURRENT DEBATE WEGARDONG 
REPEAL OF THE PROWOBITOON 
Against the background of increasing evasion 
of-the intent of prohibiting interest on demand 
deposits,  some  have  suggested  that  the 
prohibition be repealed. In a 1975 report issued 
by  the  House  Committee  on  Banking  and 
Currency entitled Financial Institutions and the 
Nation's Economy (FINE), for example, it was 
recommended  that the prohibition of  interest 
on  demand  deposits  be  phased  out  within  5 
years  following  authorizing  legislation.  One 
aspect of  the debate relates to the implication 
of  allowing explicit  interest  payments  on 
demand  deposits  for  the effectiveness  of 
monetary and fiscal policy.  Although this is  a 
4 See, for example, R. J. Barro and  Anthony Santomero, 
"Household  Money  Holdings  and  the  Demand  Deposit 
Rate," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, May  1972, 
and  "The  Impact  of  Payment  of Interest  on  Demand 
Deposits," A Study of the Staff of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System.  January 1977. 
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legitimate  concern,  it  will  not  be  discussed 
here.  Rather,  this  article  focuses  on  those 
arguments  related to the potential impact  on 
depositors  and  financial  institutions  of 
repealing the prohibition of interest on demand 
deposits. 
The Case for Retaining the Prohibition 
The view  that unregulated  rate competition 
for  deposits  would  cause  instability  in  the 
banking  system  remains a  cornerstone of  the 
argument  for  retaining  Federal  control  of 
deposit rates. Those who oppose repeal of  the 
prohibition of interest on demand deposits, for 
instance, allege that the loss  of  earnings and 
erosion  of  capital positions that would  result 
from  repeal might cause  many  banks to fail. 
Such  widespread  bank failures,  it  is  argued, 
would  seriously  threaten  the  stability  of  the 
financial system. 
There is, indeed, reason to believe that bank 
earnings  would  decline  in  the  short  run  if 
explicit interest payments on demand  deposits 
were  allowed.  Banks  have  made  decisions, 
many of which involve long-range commitments 
that are irreversible in the short run, based on 
a financial environment that includes the legal 
prohibition  of  interest  on  demand  deposits. 
One reason for establishing extensive branching 
facilities,  for  example,  may  have  been  to 
provide  convenience  to  depositors  in  lieu  of 
paying interest on their checking accounts.  In 
the  short  run,  these  and  similar  long-range 
commitments would make it difficult for banks 
to  reduce  noninterest  expenses  as  rapidly  as 
interest  expenses  would  increase  if  the 
prohibition  were  re~ealed.~  Faced  with 
See  John  D.  Paulus, "Effects of  'NOW  Accounts  on 
Costs  and  Earnings of  Commercial  Banks  in  1974-75," 
StaffEconomic Studies, No. 88, Board of Governors of the 
Federal  Reserve  System, Summer 1976, for an  additional 
reason why bank earnings might decline in the short run if 
interest payments on demand deposits were allowed. Paulus 
argues that earnings of commercial banks in  New  England 
dropped following introduction of  NOW  accounts  due to 
intense competition for market shares. 
analogous problems,  however,  banks  in  New 
England  appear  to  have  adjusted  quite 
successfully  to  the  introduction  of  interest- 
bearing demand-type  balance^.^ 
Another aspect of the argument that interest 
payments on demand deposits causes financial 
instability relates  to  bank  portfolio behavior. 
The  view  that  paying  interest  on  demand 
deposits  leads  to  excessive  competition  and 
makes banks more susceptible to failure is  as 
prevalent  today  as  it  was  in  the  1930's.  A 
number  of  authors  have  investigated  the 
validity  of  this  claim,  but  the  results  are 
inconclusive. 
Two  empirical  studies  published  in  the 
mid-1960's cast  doubt on  the contention that 
excessive rate competition in  the 1920's led  to 
unsound  banking practices which  contributed 
to  the  wave  of  bank  failures  during  the 
Depression.'  Neither of  these studies found  a 
significant relation between  the  rates  paid  on 
deposits and the probability of  failure.  Indeed, 
one of these studies found that the probability 
of  a bank failing was  inversely  related  to the 
rate  it  paid  on  demand   deposit^.^  This 
seemingly anomolous result was  interpreted  as 
indicating either (1)  that explicit  interest 
payments  were  more  effective  in  stemming 
deposit outflows than were less direct methods 
of  payment  or  (2) that banks  paying explicit 
interest were  better able to reduce their  costs 
when outflows actually occurred. In either case, 
the  study  found  that  banks  which  relied 
primarily  on  interest  incentives  to  attract 
deposits  were  less  likely  to  become  insolvent 
6 Zbid. 
George  1.  Benston,  "Interest  Payments  on  Demand 
Deposits  and  Bank  Investment  Behavior," Journal  of 
Political Economy, October 1964, and Albert M.  Cox, Jr., 
"Regulation  of  Interest  on  Bank  Deposits,"  Michigan 
Business  Studies,  Vol.  17,  No.  4,  Bureau  of  Business 
Research,  Graduate  School  of  Business  Administration 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1966). 
8 See Benston, p. 445. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City during  the  financially troubled  times  of  the 
1930's. 
The evidence  pertaining  to the  1930's, 
however, is not conclusive proof that increased 
rate competition  would  not,  in  different 
circumstances,  lead  banks  to engage  in 
practices  which  could  increase  financial 
instability. Indeed, many observers still believe 
that  competitive  pressures  arising  from 
abolition of  interest  rate  ceilings  on  deposits 
would  result  in  acquisition  of  riskier  assets 
by banks. The credibility of  this view  has been 
bolstered  by  recent  theoretical  and  empirical 
evidence.  One  study  has  demonstrated  that, 
under  certain -  conditions,  it  is  rational  for 
banks  to  adjust  their  portfolios  by  acquiring 
riskier  assets  as  a  result  of  paying  higher 
interest  for  deposit  funds.9  Another  study 
found  empirical  evidence  that  banks  had 
indeed shifted toward riskier asset portfolios as 
a result of the increase in ceiling rates on time 
deposits in the early 1%0's.  'O 
In judging whether eliminating ceiling rates 
on  bank  deposits  would  increase or  decrease 
financial stability, evidence that the riskiness of 
banks' assets is positively related to the rate of 
interest  paid  on  deposits  must  be  weighed 
against evidence that the flexibility of  meeting 
deposit withdrawals is also positively related to 
the deposit rate.  To some extent,  the answer 
will depend on whether bank failures are more 
likely  to  result  from  deposit  withdrawals  or 
from losses on assets. 
The remaining arguments  against  repealing 
the prohibition of  interest on demand deposits 
relate to the adverse impact repeal might have 
on  certain  bank  customers. One  of  the  ways 
that  banks  might 'respond  to  an  increase  in 
interest costs is to attempt to increase revenues 
9  Carl  Gambs,  "Interest  Bearing  Demand  Deposits and 
Bank  Portfolio  Behavior," Southern  Economic Journal, 
July  1975. 
lo  Stanley  C.  Silverberg,  "Deposit  Costs  and  Bank 
Portfolio Policy," Journal of  Finance, September 1973. 
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by  raising lending rates and service charges. If 
so,  loan customers and depositors with  small 
but  active  checking  accounts  might  be 
adversely  affected  by  repeal.  It is  uncertain, 
however,  whether  banks  could  increase 
revenues by charging higher rates on loans. The 
credit  market  in  most  areas  is  sufficiently 
competitive to ensure that borrowers have the 
opportunity to choose among alternative loan 
sources.  The  decline in  the  number  of  loan 
customers which would result from the increase 
in a bank's  lending rate might be so great that 
the -net  effect  would  be  a  decline  in  loan 
revenues  rather than the anticipated  increase. 
If  so,  banks  would  find  it  unprofitable  to 
maintain the higher lending rates. 
Even if loan rates and service charges were to 
increase somewhat because of  the payment  of 
interest on demand deposits, many would deny 
that these increases  would  necessarily  be 
undesirable. They could be considered adverse, 
these  observers  maintain,  only  to  the  extent 
that  it  is  appropriate  to  subsidize  banks' 
lending  rates  by  forcing  checking  account 
customers to accept lower than a market rate of 
return on their demand deposits. 
It is important to note the arguments which 
are not among those currently given in support 
of  retaining  the  prohibition  of  interest  on 
demand deposits.  No  one currently maintains, 
as some did in the  1930's, that payments for 
Federal deposit insurance  are  a  threat  to the 
solvency  of  the  banking  system.  Similarly, 
developments  have  rendered  obsolete  the 
concerns about  interest payments on  bankers' 
balances.  Deposit  insurance  has  reduced  the 
probability of financial panics, and the Federal 
Reserve  restricts  the  extent  to  which  money 
market  banks  can  finance  stock  market 
activity.  Moreover, the Federal  funds  market 
allows  banks  to  earn  interest  on  short-term 
funds,  and  the  Federal  Reserve's  seasonal 
borrowing privilege for member banks has been 
established to alleviate the problems associated 
with seasonal fluctuations in credit demand. 
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The Case Against Retaining 
The Prohibition 
The arguments  against  prohibiting explicit 
payment of  interest on demand  deposits  have 
come primarily from economists. They object to 
the  prohibition  because  it  restricts  the  free 
operation of competitive market forces. At least 
since the time of  Adam Smith,  it  has been  a 
basic  tenet  of  economic  analysis  that 
competition is conducive to efficient  allocation 
of society's  scarce resources. Accordingly, 
economists argue that restrictions on  the 
operation of competitive markets tend to result 
in  waste  and  inefficiency.  Economists  have 
identified  two  distinct  sources  of  inefficiency 
stemming from the prohibition of interest pay- 
ments  on  demand  deposits:  (1)  the  waste  of 
resources  resulting from  provision of  banking 
services which  are of  little value  to depositors 
and  (2) the waste  of  resources  resulting from 
socially unproductive  efforts  to economize  on 
demand deposit balances. 
Economists maintain that the prohibition of 
interest on demand deposits tends to cause too 
many  resources  to be  devoted  to provision of 
banking services. This inefficiency results from 
the  fact  that  banks  have  responded  to  the 
prohibition  by  offering  services  to depositors 
below cost.  The numerous methods devised by 
banks to make checking accounts attractive to 
the public are, in effect, ways of paying interest 
implicitly on those accounts. The most straight- 
forward  method  of  providing  a  nonmonetary 
return  on  demand  deposits  is  remission  of 
service charges--e.g.,  "free checking." 
In its  purest form,  free  checking  is  a  plan 
whereby depositors can write as many checks as 
they wish regardless of the size of their balances 
11 See  Harry  G.  Johnson,  "Problems  of  Efficiency  in 
Monetary  Management," Journal  of  Political  Economy 
(September/October  1968).  pp.  972-81,  for  a  thorough 
discussion of  the  sources  of  economic  inefficiency  which 
result  from  prohibition  of  interest  payments  on demand 
deposits. 
without paying any service charges. Despite the 
costliness to the banking system of  processing 
checks,  depositors  have  no  price  incentive  to 
economize on the number of checks they write. 
As  a result, they tend to overutilize  the check 
processing  facilities  of  the  banking  system. 
Thus, the divergence  between  the cost  to the 
banking system  of  providing  services and  the 
cost  to depositors  of  utilizing  those  services 
leads to an inefficient  allocation of  resources. 
Society's  scarce  resources  are devoted  to 
producing  services  which  would  not  be 
demanded if  individuals were required  to pay 
the cost of  producing those services. 
The  second  way  in  which  prohibition  of 
interest  on  demand  deposits  leads  to 
inefficiency is  that it encourages depositors to 
waste resources on socially unproductive efforts 
to  economize  on  their  demand  deposit 
balances. Individuals allocate their wealth 
among alternative assets primarily on the basis 
of  the relative yield  on  those  assets.  Whereas 
the yield on most financial assets is in the form 
of  cash  payments  which  can  be  used  to 
purchase a wide variety of goods and services, 
the yield on demand deposits is constrained to 
take the form of  banking services. Since some 
of  these  services  may  be  of  little  value  to 
depositors, individuals may perceive the return 
on  demand  deposits  to  be  quite  This 
leads  to  an  exaggerated  disparity  between 
individuals'  perception of the yield on demand 
12  A major source of confusion in evaluating the potential 
gains from paying interest on demand deposits arises from 
failure  to  distinguish  between  the  costs  to  banks  of 
providing services and the  valuation  of  those  services by 
depositors. Some have argued, for instance, that repealing 
the prohibition of interest  on demand deposits  would  not 
benefit depositors since banks already pay the equivalent of 
a market rate on checking accounts in  the form of implicit 
interest.  Even  if  banks incur the same  costs in  providing 
free services as they would if  interest  were  paid explicitly, 
however,  individuals  may  value  the  two  types  of  return 
quite  differently.  Moreover,  an explicit  monetary  return 
might  benefit  depositors  if  it  facilitated  comparison 
between the yields offered by  different financial institutions 
on demand-type balances. 
Federal Rese~e  Bank  of  Kansas City deposits and the yield on alternative assets and 
creates an incentive for depositors to economize 
on the amount held in checking accounts. They 
can do this by transferring funds from interest- 
bearing assets into their checking accounts only 
when necessary to do so in order to prevent a 
deficiency  of  their  balance.  The  amount  of 
depositors' resources devoted to effecting these 
transfers would  be reduced  if  explicit  interest 
were paid on demand deposits." 
In  summary,  economists'  criticism  of  the 
prohibition of  interest  on  demand  deposits is 
that  the  prohibition  discourages  competition 
and  causes  an  inefficient  use  of  resources. 
Valuable resources are expended both by banks 
and  depositors  in  efforts  to  circumvent  the 
prohibition.  Lest  it  be  thought  that  the 
potential gains to society from  correcting  the 
misallocation  would  be  negligible,  it  is 
important to note that the cost of  operating the 
nation's payment mechanism is considerable. It 
has been estimated that the cost of  processing 
checks  in  1972,  for  instance,  was  over  $8 
billion.14 Thus,  even  minor  improvements  in 
the efficiency of  the payment system could yield 
substantial resource savings. 
THE POTENTIAL OMPACT OF AbbOWAIING 
EXPLICIT ONTIEWEST ON DEMAND 
DEPOSITS: A  WIEEVAblOATUON 
Explicit  interest  probably  would  not 
completely  supplant  implicit  interest  as  a 
method  of  attracting  demand  deposits  if  the 
legal  prohibition of  explicit  interest  were 
removed. Despite the apparent presumption to 
the contrary  by  many of  the  proponents  and 
opponents of  repeal,  free checking and  other 
13 These transfers are costly to banks as well as depositors. 
The  increasing  use  of  telephone  transfers  from  time 
deposits to demand deposits, for instance, imposes costs on 
banks which could be reduced if banks were allowed to pay 
interest directly on checking account balances. 
l4  Carl  Gambs, "The Cost of the U.S. Payments System," 
Journal of Bank Research (Winter 19761, pp. 241-42. 
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methods  of  paying  implicit  interest  do  not 
result  solely  from  the  legal  prohibition  of 
explicit  interest.  Indeed,  there  is  reason  to 
believe  that many depositors  would  prefer  to 
receive  some  portion  of  the  yield  on  their 
checking account balances as implicit interest 
rather than to receive  the entire return in the 
form of money income. If so, banks would find 
it  profitable  to  continue  to  offer  implicit 
interest as  part of  the total yield  on demand 
deposits. It is necessary to take this possibility 
into  account  when  analyzing  the  potential 
impact  on  economic  efficiency  and  financial 
stability of  repealing the prohibition of  interest 
on demand deposits. 
The  desire  by  some  depositors  to  receive 
implicit  interest  stems,  in  part,  from  the 
structure  of  the  tax  system.  With  few 
exceptions, the income tax laws apply only  to 
money income. There is, therefore, an incentive 
to  reduce  one's  tax  liability  by  receiving 
payment  in  nonmonetary  form  whenever 
convenient  to  do  so.  Implicit  interest  on 
checking  accounts  is  one  case  in  which  the 
potential gains from  avoiding taxable  income 
may  outweigh  the  inconvenience  of  receiving 
nonmonetary  payments.  It is  possible,  in 
other  words,  that  receipt  of  free  banking 
services  in  lieu  of' monetary  interest  income 
maximizes  the aftertax  return  (net  of  service 
charges)  in  some  instances.  Thus,  it  is  not 
always true, as is often alleged, that "The sum 
expended  [by  banks]  in  providing  free 
services . . . would  be  more  valuable  to 
depositors  if  received  in  cash  than  when 
received  in  kind for the usual reason that the 
depositors could, if  they wished,  buy precisely 
the  same  services  with  cash  but  would 
undoubtedly choose not to do so."15 
To illustrate this point, assume that the cost 
'of providing free services to a depositor is $100 
15 Milton Friedman, "Controls on Interest  Rates Paid by 
Banks,"  Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking (February 
1970), p. 27. 
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per year and that additions to the depositor's 
income are taxed at a  rate of  40 per cent.  If, 
instead  of  spending the $100  to  provide  free 
services, the bank paid the $100 directly to the 
depositor as monetary interest on his checking 
account, the depositor would be required to pay 
$40 of  the interest income in taxes and would 
have only $60 left with which to purchase goods 
and  services.  Even  if  he  chose  to spend  the 
entire $60  increment to his disposable income 
for banking services,  the depositor would  not 
be  able  to  purchase  as  many  services  as  he 
received  free of  charge  when  the yield  on  his 
checking account was  in the form of  implicit 
interest. 
This is not to say that depositors would never 
choose  to  receive  any  of  the  yield  on  their 
checking  accounts  in  the  form  of  explicit 
interest. Suppose, for instance, that individuals 
find it so convenient to make certain types of 
payments  by  check  that  they  would  write  a 
given  number  of  "essential" checks  even  if 
charged the full cost of  clearing those checks 
but that there are additional checks which are 
"optional," and would  only  be written if  they 
were  provided  free  of  charge.  In  these 
circumstances, the individuals  might well 
prefer to receive part of  the total yield on their 
demand  deposits  as  reduced  fees  for  those 
checks  which  are  deemed  essential  and  the 
remainder  as  an  explicit  monetary  interest 
payment.  l6 
In  the  context  of  the  previous  example, 
assume that the  hypothetical depositor would 
buy only $50 of  banking services if  required to 
pay for them-that  is, it would  cost the bank 
$50  to  provide  those  services  which  the 
depositor deems "essential." In  this  case,  a 
16 More  precisely,  an  individual  would  maximize  the 
return on his checking account by  having charges remitted 
on  those  services  that  would  have  been  utilized  if  the 
depositor were  required to pay  the  full, cost  of  providing 
those services. 
$100 expenditure by  the bank  might  be  most 
valuable  to  this  depositor  if  divided  equally 
between implicit and explicit interest. The $50 
of  implicit  interest  enables  the  depositor  to 
obtain the banking services that he would  have 
used  in  any event  without  paying tax  on  the 
nonmonetary income; and the $50 of  explicit 
interest  yields  $30  [=(I -  .40)  x  ($SO)]  of 
disposable income,  which  is  presumed  to  be 
more  valuable  to the depositor  than  an 
additional  $50 of  banking  services.  Although 
this  example  is  highly  simplified,  it 
demonstrates  why  depositors  might  prefer  to 
receive  part  of  the  yield  on  their  checking 
accounts  in  the  form  of  remitted  service 
charges. Since  depositors would  benefit from 
arrangements  involving  implicit  interest, 
provisibn  of  banking  services  at reduced  cost 
might  be  expected  to  continue  even  if  the 
prohibition of explicit interest were repealed. 
In general, a depositor's preferences between 
implicit and explicit interest would depend, in 
part, on  his  marginal  tax  rate  and  need  for 
banking services. The higher the rate at which 
monetary  income  is  taxed,  for  instance,  the 
greater  is  the  incentive  to  receive  implicit 
interest. Obviously, banks could  not negotiate 
with  each depositor  to determine  the optimal 
banking  plan  for  his  personal  needs.  In  an 
effort to make checking.accounts as attractive 
as  possible  to  a  wide  segment  of  depositors, 
however,  banks  might  be  expected  to offer a 
variety  of  checking  account  plans  which 
combine  explicit  interest  and  remission  of 
service charges in varying degrees. One possible 
plan  might entail  remission of  service charges 
in direct proportion to the size of  the minimum 
balance and payment of  explicit interest on the 
amount held in excess of  that minimum. 
Since implicit interest would  remain part of 
the  banking  environment  even  if  all  legal 
constraints  on  interest  payments  on  demand 
deposits were removed, some of the inefficiency 
associated with implicit  interest payments 
would remain even if interest rate ceilings were 
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abolished." Removing  the  constraint  on  the 
way  in  which  banks  can  compete for  deposit 
funds would, however, allow  greater flexibility 
in  designing  programs  to  meet  the  needs  of 
depositors. This would  be  expected  to reduce 
the disparity between individuals' valuation of 
the yield  on  demand  deposits  and  their 
valuation  of  the  yield  on  alternative  assets. 
There  would,  therefore,  be  less  incentive  for 
depositors  to engage  in  socially  wasteful 
activities in  attempts to minimize the amount 
held  in demand deposits. Similarly, depositors 
would  be  less  prone  to  overutilize  banking 
services if given greater opportunity to choose a 
desired  mix  of  implicit  and  explicit  interest. 
Thus, repeal of  the prohibition of  interest  on 
demand deposits would be expected to result in 
some improvement in  economic efficiency; the 
potential benefits, however, are not as great as 
some have claimed. 
By  the  same  token,  though,  the  potential 
costs of  repeal are not as great as many have 
predicted.  Because  depositors  will  not 
uniformly prefer accounts whose total yield is in 
the form of  monetary interest, banks would not 
l7  It  should  be  noted  that  receiving some portion  of the 
yield on demand deposits as implicit interest may  actually 
be beneticial.  To the extent that both payment of monetary 
interest  to  depositors and  payment  of  service charges  by 
depositors involve transactions' costs, economic efficiency 
would be enhanced by netting out service charges from the 
monetary interest  payable to depositors, thereby  avoiding 
unnecessary reciprocal payments. 
be forced to convert totally to a new  method of 
attracting checking account funds.  Thus,  the 
impact  of  repeal  on  banks'  earnings  and 
portfolio behavior might not cause the degree 
of financial instability that some fear. 
The general belief that interest payments on 
demand deposits had  contributed  to financial 
instability resulted in  the total  prohibition  of 
interest  on  demand  deposits  in  1933. 
Subsequently,  banks  have  devised  numerous 
methods  of  paying  interest  implicitly  on 
checking account funds  by  providing  services 
below  cost  to  their  customers.  A  number  of 
recent financial innovations have contributed to 
reconsideration of  the desirability of  repealing 
the  initial  prohibition.  The  proponents  of 
repeal allege that interest ceilings distort 
resource  allocation  and  lead  to  inefficiency. 
The opponents of  repeal fear that the possible 
gains in efficiency would  be far outweighed by 
the  general  disruption  to  customary  banking 
procedures and the adverse effects on  certain 
classes of bank customers. Both the proponents 
and opponents of  repeal have exaggerated the 
effects of  allowing explicit interest on demand 
deposits. Because the tax system would  remain 
as an incentive for implicit rather than explicit 
yields, repeal of the legal prohibition of  interest 
on  demand deposits might result in  relatively 
minor changes from prevailing practices. 
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